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COMMENTS
JURISDICTION AND THE NOMADIC RESIDENT
By JAMES H. BtmK
It was once true that the power of a state to render a personal judgment
was circumscribed by its territorial limits. This was thought to follow from
the fact that common law procedures were geared to the actual physical
presence of the defendant or the subject of the action.1 As the static common
law forms and notions slowly eroded, the territorial limits doctrine was
gradually replaced with a patchwork of exceptions and substitute rules. To-
day, a state has power to confer on its courts personal jurisdiction over absent
domiciliaries, 2 over nonresidents who have impliedly consented to service,'
over nonresidents who have performed certain acts within the state4 and fi-
nally, it was recently held in Myrck v. Superior Court,5 and in Allen v. Su-
perior Court,' over absent residents.
In the Myrick case two residents of California were involved in an auto-
mobile accident in California. The injured party filed an action against the
other, Myrick, but before process was served on him, Myrick was arrested on
a New York warrant, taken to New York and lodged in a penitentiary there.
Under section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure,' which provides for out-of-
state service in limited situations,' plaintiff served Myrick in the New York
penitentiary. Myrick made a special appearance in the California court con-
testing the validity of the service but it was sustained. He then petitioned for
a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from proceeding further in the
action. The District Court of Appeal denied the petition and in an extremely
1McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1916); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892), Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ; De ]a Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896) ;
Merchant's National Union v. Bmsserett, 15 Cal.App. 444, 115 Pac. 58 (1911); see also Dodd,
Jurisdiction In Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REv. 427 (1928).
'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; Fernandez v. Casey, 77 Tex. 452, 14 S.W 149 (1890).
aWuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926); Kane v.
State of New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) ; Frey and Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.2d 401,
55 P.2d 203 (1936) ; Briggs v. Superior Court, 81 CaLApp.2d 240, 183 P.2d 758 (1947) ; Berger v.
Superior Court, 79 Cal.App.2d 425, 179 P.2d 600 (1947)
"International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5117 A.C.A. 592, 256 P.2d 348 (1953) A subsequent petition for a writ of prohibition was dis-
charged by the California Supreme Court in 41 A.C. 530, 261 P.2d 255 (1953)
°41 A.C. 313, 259 P.2d 905 (1953).
'CAUF. CODE CrV. PROC. § 412 (Deering, 1953) has been on the California statute books since
1872. It authorizes service by publication under limited conditions.
'Section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure was added by Calif. Stats. 1951, c. 935, § 1. It
limits personal jurisdiction of the courts, which is acquired by publication, to those cases m which
the defendant is served personally and in which he was a resident at the tine of the commence-
ment of the action or the time of service. While apparently limiting personal jurisdiction this statute
actually broadens it, for unless the Legislature meant to grant in personam jurisdiction over absent
residents, wluch the California courts had never before had, the statute is meaningless.
This policy of legislating by incorporating a statute seventy-five years old in a new statute is
highly undesirable. A great deal of litigation is concerned with interpretation and construction of
statutes and this is certainly not avoided by adopting verbatim a statute written years ago.
1 (191)
lucid and well-reasoned opinion held: (1) that states have sufficient power to
subject absent residents to their process; and (2) that sections 412 and 417 of
the Code of Civil Procedure satisfied the due process requirement of the
Federal Constitution.
Section 417 of the California Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
"Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of this state
by publication of summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413, the
court shall have the power to render a personal judgment against such person
only if he was personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint,
and was a resident of this State at the time of the commencement of the action
or at the time of service."
That portion of section 412' pertinent here provides that when a person
has departed from the state, cannot be found, conceals himself or resides out
of the state and a cause of action is stated against him, service may be made
by publication. Section 4 13 "0 outlines the procedure necessary to make this
service acceptable. The form of language used in section 417 would seem to
indicate that the Legislature intended to limit the operation of sections 412
and 413, but the court held that its actual effect was to grant jurisdiction in
personal actions while at the same time limiting it by requiring personal
service on the absent resident. The crucial questions for decision in the
Myrick case were whether the state had power to exercise jurisdiction in per-
sonam over absent residents and whether the notice requirement of the statute
satisfied due process.
Power
The common law jurisdictional limits were thought to be concurrent
with the physical boundaries of the state. Theorists said that no court could
make a judicial determination of rights it was powerless to enforce. In order
to carry out a determination of rights adverse to the defendant, the court had
to have power over the defendant's body or his property." This view that
physical power over the defendant is necessary has had many modern pro-
ponents. Justice Holmes stated it clearly in McDonald v. Mabee.
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized
times it is not necessary to maintain that power through proceedings prop-
erly begun, and although submission to jurisdiction by appearance may take
the place of service upon the person. No doubt there may be some extension
of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond service or appearance but the
foundation should be borne in mind." 2
'The remaining part of 412 provides for service by publication in an action which relates to
real or personal property.
"Section 413 directs that publication be made in a newspaper except that where the residence
of the defendant is known a copy of the summons and complaint must be deposited in the post
office, directed to the person sought to be served.
"See note 1 supra.
12243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916)
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The physical power theory of jurisdiction was the basis of many early
American decisions, chief among them the oft-cited, oft-maligned case of
Pennoyer v. Neff."3 The Pennoyer case held that one state lacked power to
acquire jurisdiction in personam over a defendant in another state by con-
structive service. California had De la Montanya v. De la Montanya"4 and the
rule that the California courts could not secure in personam jurisdiction over
absent domiciliaries despite a statute specifically authorizing it. 5 The phys-
ical presence rule was absolute and uncompromising. Either a defendant was
present in the jurisdiction or the plaintiff was out of court.
(a) Implied Consent To Jurisdiction.
Around the turn of the century courts began edging away from the
physical power theory of jurisdiction. While stoutly continuing to maintain
that physical power was the basis of jurisdiction they began to find physical
power in strange fact combinations. Thus where defendant drove his auto-
mobile into1" or through"T a state he was held to have consented to service of
process by a jurisdiction in which he was neither a resident nor a domiciliary.
The Supreme Court of the United States sanctioned this doctrine of implied
consent as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the states.1" The Court
said that article IV, section 2 of the Constitution safeguarded to the citizens
of one state the right to pass through or reside in any other state. It reasoned
that although a state may not prevent nonresidents from using its highways,
under the police power it may stipulate that by this use nonresidents im-
pliedly consent to service of process.
Although this theory solves the problems connected with automobile
accidents involving nonresidents, the consent implied is largely fictional. 9
However, statutes providing for implied consent have been held valid wher-
ever they have contained a provision making it reasonably probable that
notice of service would actually be communicated to the nonresident defend-
ant.2" To the extent that the consent is fictional it is an application of state
power beyond the physical power theory.
(b) Jurisdiction Over Absent Domiciliaries.
The second departure from the strict physical power rule was crystal-
lized in Millikenv.Meyer."1 Milliken obtained a judgment in Wyoming against
1395 U.S. 714 (1877).
1112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
25At the time of the De la Montanya decision Califorma had a code section which was substan-
tially the same as the present 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, its operation was limited
to in rem actions by the De la Montanya decision.
"'Kane v. State of New Jersey, supra note 3.
"'Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 3.18Wuchter v. Pizzutti, Hess v. Pawloski, Kane v. State of New Jersey, supra note 3.
"Allen v. Superior Court, supra note 6.
2"Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra note 3.21311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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Meyer, a domiciliary of Wyoming. Meyer was absent from Wyoming at that
time, but he was served personally in Colorado. The court gave judgment
against Meyer, but he sought an injunction in Colorado to prevent Milliken
from enforcing it. The Supreme Court of the United States held that under
the full faith and credit clause Colorado was required to recognize the Wy-
oming judgment. It said that domicile with its reciprocal rights and duties
is sufficient to authorize a state to give a personal judgment against an absent
domiciliary.
"The authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by
the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him
privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his
domicil may also exact reciprocal duties. . . The relationship is not dis-
solved by mere absence from the state. . One such incident of domicil is
amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state,
where the state has provided and employed a reasonable method for appris-
ing such an absent party of proceedings against him." 22
That substituted service is wholly sufficient to meet the requirements of
due process was decided by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Mabee.23 In
that case it was held that the adequacy of service was dependent on whether
or not the form employed was reasonably calculated to give the defendant
notice and opportunity to be heard.
The domiciliary extension of jurisdiction was a logical development in a
federation of states. "It would be very inconvenient if this were not the law.
An individual may be concealing himself to prevent service of process; he
may be absent in parts unknown. But every person has a domicile."24 Domi-
ciliary jurisdiction openly departs from the physical power theory of juris-
diction. Even though a defendant may be physically absent from the state,
there is such a relation between him and his domicile that he may be subject
to process therein.
(c) Jurisdiction Based On Acts Done In The Forum.
The case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington25 added a
further refinement to rules of jurisdiction. Here salesmen of an out-of-state
shoe firm systematically and continuously exhibited samples and took orders
in the state of Washington. By statute Washington required all employers to
pay a specified percentage of wages into an unemployment fund. The Inter-
national Shoe Company refused to pay into this fund and claimed that it was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Washington courts. The United States
Supreme Court held that the corporation's activities in Washington had estab-
21d. at 463.
"See note 12 supra.
"GoODRICi, CONFLICT OF LAws 192 (3d ed. 1949)25326 U.S. 310 (1945).
(Vol. 5
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lished sufficient contacts with that state to make it reasonable and just to sub.
ject the corporation to the power of Washington. Thus, even without a statute
to supply an implied consent to jurisdiction a nonresident may subject him.
self to the jurisdiction of a state by doing certain acts. The decision speaks
of "minimum contacts."
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him .... But now that the
capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons
or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment zn personam, if he be not present within the ter-
ritory of the forum he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice'. '26
Jurisdiction based on "acts done" by a nonresident within the boundaries
of the state is a significant extension of state power. No longer is there any
pretense that the basis of this power is physical power. The Supreme Court
says instead that authority by physical arrest has now given way to authority
by personal service and as a consequence only certain "minimum contacts"
between the state and the individual are now necessary to give the state juris-
diction. However, these "minimum contacts" are sufficient to give the state
in personam power over the individual only if it does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
(d) Jurisdiction Over Absent Residents.
The holding that a court has power over absent domiciliarzes is one step
from holding that a court has power over absent residents. "Residence" as a
legal status is acquired by physical presence as an inhabitant in a given
place.2" "Domicile" as a legal status is acquired by physical presence plus an
intention to make that place one's domicile.2" An existing domicile, whether
of origin or selection, continues until a new one is acquired.2 Often "resi-
dence" and "domicile" are used synonymously or one is used to mean the
other."0 When a Legislature uses one or the other there is a presumption that
it uses the term in its natural sense, unless the context indicates otherwise. 8'
2"Id. at 316.
"7Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal.App.2d 828, 155 P.2d 671 (1945).
-"In re Glassford's Estate, 114 CaLApp.2d 181, 249 P.2d 908 (1953) ; Kopasz v. Kopasz, 107
CaLApp.2d 308, 237 P.2d 284 (1953).
:'In re Giassford's Estate, supra note 28.
809 CAL. Jun., Domicile § 2.
zlCALI. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1858 (Deering, 1953) provides: "In the construction of a statute
or instrument, the office of the judge is sinply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in sub-
stance contained thereon, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted;
and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible to be adopted
as will give effect to all"
1954]
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There is nothing in section 417 to indicate that the California Legislature used
the word "residence" to mean "domicile." Indeed, the context indicates cer-
tainly that "residence" is meant by the word "residence," for "absence" is
indicated as its alternative.
In the Myrick case, petitioner argued that under the De la Montanya case
California had established her policy against extra-territorial service under
sections 412 and 413, the sections referred to by section 4.17 It had been held
in the De la Montanya case that California could not secure jurisdiction over
an absent domiciliary by publication under section 412 and 413 so as to
render a valid judgment against him for aliihony and support, child custody
and support. In the Myrick case the District Court of Appeal held that if the
De la Montanya case were still law in California, it would prevent the acqui-
sition of personal jurisdiction by extra-territorial service. However, it said,
since the De la Montanya case was predicated upon Pennoyer v. Neff, and
since that portion of the Pennoyer case which held that one state lacked power
to acquire jurisdiction in personam over a defendant in another state by
substituted service had not been followed, the De la Montanya case was no
longer law in California.32 The court said:
"In recent years there have been many limitations placed on the concept
of lack of power in a state to thus acquire jurisdiction over an absent defend-
ant, as well as a repudiation of the concept that due process is somehow in-
volved in the problem." 33
The court then relied on the International Shoe case and held that if a
defendant is not present within the territory of the forum, the forum has
power to render a judgment in personam against him if he has "minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice'. '"" Residence, it said, is
sufficient contact to give a state power over an absent resident within the con-
fines of the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice.
The Supreme Court of California passed on the constitutionality of
section 417 in Allen v. Superior Court. The facts of the Allen case are essen-
tially the same as those of the Myrick case. Quoting Goodrich Conflict of
Laws, the court held that the "rendition of a valid personal judgment against
a defendant requires that he be a member of a class subject to its power and
that he have proper notification of the action with an opportunity to appear
therein." 35 After a review of the Pennoyer case, the De la Montanya case and
"A scant eight years previously in Pinon v. Pollard, 69 Cal.App.2d 129, 158 P.2d 254 (1945),
the court had held that despite the Milliken case, in California the De la Montanya case controlled,
and constructive service on a domiciliary did not give a California court junsdiction over him. In
the Myrick case the court skirted the edge of contradiction, but avoided it nicely by saying that in
section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure, California had changed its "policy" on this question.
"117 A.C.A. 592, 596, 256 P.2d 348, 351 (1953)
" bid.
541 A.C. 313, 316, 259 P.2d 905, 907 (1953).
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the Milliken case the court noted the trend of the decisions toward expanding
the authority of a state. It said:
"The decision in the Milliken case is entirely in keeping with present day
needs affecting the power of a state to acquire jurisdiction over persons who
have departed from its borders. The increasingly artificial nature of state
boundaries, the expanding of metropolitan areas into two or more states, and
the multiplying transportation facilities, especially through the widespread
use of automobiles and trucks affecting the mobility of population, all bear
signficantly on the problem of process. The necessities of the situation are
recognized in the nonresident motorist statutes .... "36
Due Process
Although a state may have power to bind absent residents or domicii-
aries in personal actions, it must exercise that power within the limits of due
process. In McDonald v. Mabee, McDonald, a domiciliary of Texas, left the
state intending to make his home elsewhere. During his absence an action
was begun against him in a Texas court. After returning and remaining for a
short time, he departed finally and established his domicile in another state.
The service in the action was by publication in a newspaper after his final
departure from Texas. Based on this service a personal money judgment was
rendered against him which was sustained by the Supreme Court of Texas.
McDonald appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States claiming a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held the judg-
ment against him void. The point was not that Texas did not have power, for
it was granted that a summons left "at the last and usual place of abode"
would have been sufficient to give jurisdiction. However, "to dispense with
personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is
the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done." Here
due process was held to require substituted service rather than service by
publication.
In Milliken v. Meyer, the court held that the adequacy of a statute au-
thorizing service on an absent domiciliary was dependent on whether it
accorded the defendant due process. The test, it was held, is whether the form
of the service provided by the statute was reasonably calculated to give the
defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
If it did, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice were
satisfied and the state had power to render a personal judgment.37
Since service of process is one of the preliminary procedures of a hear-
ing, if fair notice of the pendency of the litigation is given a defendant there
is usually an opportunity to be heard. The satisfaction of due process then
"Id. at 318, 259 P.2d at 908.
"7311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
19541
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becomes a question of whether the service required is reasonably calculated
to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings. In the Allen case the
court held that section 417 satisfied the requirement of due process because
"no more certain provision for defendant's receipt of actual notice of the
institution of litigation against him could be made than through the specified
personal service of process,""8 even though made outside the territorial limits
of the state.
Conclusion
The Myrick rule undoubtedly presages new developments in the field of
Procedure and Conflict of Laws. With the adoption of section 417 California
has spearheaded a trend toward liberalization of the basis of jurisdiction,
long apparent in the American decisions. The previously accepted domicili-
ary rule was unsatisfactory because it put the onus of jurisdiction-guessing
on one who sought to sue a nomadic defendant. If his guess was wrong, he
had invested time and money for naught, while the statute of limitations of
the "proper" jurisdiction continued to run. 9 As contrasted with "domicile"
which may be based on "secret intent, ' . 0 "residence" is easy to ascertain and
apply. The defendant is a resident of the state which he inhabits. Therefore,
from the point of view of the plaintiff, residence is a more satisfactory cri-
terion of jurisdiction than domicile.
From the defendant's point of view residence is also a more satisfactory
criterion of jurisdiction than domicile. Presumably the defendant is in legal
difficulties because of an unfortunate error and is anxious to have his liabil-
ities ascertained. It seems elementary that he would rather be sued in the
jurisdiction of his residence than in a foreign place the law calls his domicile.
8841 A.C. 313, 319, 259 P.2d 905, 909 (1953).
"In Pinon v. Pollard, supra note 32, plaintiff made the mistake of tinking that a jockey who
had a house in California was also domiciled there. Actually, he had married a woman who lived
in the east and had formed a secret intent of changing his domicile.
"De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, supra, note 1.
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